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What  Do Cross-Country  Studies 
Teach about Government  Involvement, 
Prosperity, and Economic Growth? 
OVER  THE LAST three decades, in all industrialized  countries, there  has 
been an enormous  expansion of government  involvement  in the econ- 
omy, as measured  by the share of national income going to taxes or 
government expenditures. Figure 1 shows that, averaged over the 
OECD countries, the ratio of either tax collections or government  ex- 
penditures  to GDP rose sharply  between 1970 and 1990. Arguably  it is 
this expansion of  government that uniquely characterizes  the post- 
World  War  II era. 
From  the beginning, the growth in government  has attracted  critics 
who view this as an ominous development, endangering  the political 
rights  of the citizenry  and  economic  prosperity.  Leav-ing  aside  the issues 
of political freedom, this paper  critically evaluates  the evidence about 
the influence of government  tax and expenditures  on economic pros- 
perity and growth. 
It is worth pausing to reflect on what evidence would constitute 
support  for the proposition  that  expanded  government  activity  has been 
misguided. One option would be to assess the extent to which the goals 
of government  expansion-provision  of public goods, maintenance  of 
full employment, insurance  against social risks, income maintenance, 
and  adequate  provision  of certain  basic goods and  services  such as food, 
shelter, and medical care to all-have  been achieved. Another  would 
be to assess the cost, in terms  of a lower average  standard  of living, of 
the programs  designed to achieve this goal. Economists  are a long way 
from  consensus on measuring  either  the benefits  or costs of government 
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Figure 1. Expenditure  Ratio, Tax Ratio, and Real GDP Per Capita, OECD 
Countries, 1970-90a 
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the author's calculations using data from International  Monetary  Fund  ( 1994). Real GDP per capita is the author's calculation 
using the OECD's Nationail  Accounts Statistics,  1994. 
a. Twenty-four countries, excluding Mexico. 
b. Unweighted average, exchange rates and price levels of  1990. 
c.  Unweighted average. 
involvement.  However, even a consensus  on these two questions  would 
not settle whether  the big-government  era has been a mistake, because 
weighing the benefits against the costs inevitably  involves value judg- 
ments, about which economics is mute. This said, pinning down the 
cost is bound to be informative  in the debate, because it can then, at 
least qualitatively, be stacked up against  the benefits. 
There are two approaches  to measuring  this cost: the "bottom-up" 
approach  and the "top-down" approach.  The bottom-up  approach  es- 
timates cost country  by country, program  by program,  and tax by tax. 
With all interactions  among programs  appropriately  accounted  for, the 
sum of these costs provides an estimate  of the total cost of government 
involvement.  There  have been hundreds,  perhaps  thousands,  of studies 
of the impact  of particular  government  programs  and tax features, fre- 
quently including an estimate of the associated  economic cost. 
There has been a much smaller, although  growing, number  of top- 
down studies, which investigate the association between a measure  of 
the aggregate  extent of government  involvement  and a measure  of eco- Joel Slemrod  375 
Figure 2. GDP Per Capita and Tax Ratio, United States, 1929-92 
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Source: Real GDP per capita for 1929-49  is from U.S.  Bureau of the Census ( 1975), and for 1950-92  fronm  version 5.6 
of the data in Summers and Heston (1991).  Tax ratio (general government tax revenue/GDP) is the author's calculation 
using data from the Economic Report of the Presidetnt, 1971,  1991, and 1995. 
nomic  prosperity  or growth.  The connection  between  the bottom-up  and 
the top-down studies is not usually emphasized, but is worth making 
explicit: If each government  program  has a cost then, across  jurisdic- 
tions or over time, the greater  the level of government  involvement, 
the greater  the cost. In the top-down studies the cost is not measured 
explicitly; rather, it is  measured implicitly as foregone income or 
growth.  I 
This empirical  program,  at least as it relates  to the level, rather  than 
the growth rate of prosperity,  runs into an immediate  snag that is dis- 
concerting  to anyone who is convinced that government  has a substan- 
tial negative impact on prosperity.  Both for a given country  over time 
and across countries, there is often a positive  correlation  between real 
income  per  capita  and  the relative  extent  of government.  Figure  2 shows 
the time-series  relationship  for the United States, plotting  real GDP per 
1. Note, though, that the top-down studies are invariably  concerned  with the net 
cost or benefit  of government  activity, while the bottom-up  studies  of taxation  typically 
ignore any productivity  benefits that might be associated with the expenditure  of the 
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Figure 3. Tax Ratio versus Real GDP Per Capita, OECD Countries, 1990 
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Source: Tax ratio (general government tax revenue/GDP) is the author's calculation using data from Organisation for 
Economic Co-operation and Development (1994).  Real GDP per capita is from version 5.6  of the data in Summers and 
Heston ( 1991). 
capita  and  the ratio of taxes at all levels of government  to GDP, for the 
period 1929-92.  The strong positive association is clear. The unprec- 
edented growth of government  has occurred  over the same period as 
the unprecedented  growth of prosperity.  The same story applies to all 
of the developed world. 
Across countries, the relationship  between  prosperity  and  the extent 
of government  is less clear. As figures  3 and  4 show, among  the OECD 
countries no obvious correlation  exists for either tax or expenditure 
ratios in 1990. In figures 5 and 6, which plot data for all countries, 
there  is apparently  a positive relationship,  although  it rests, for the most 
part, on a comparison  between the high-tax OECD countries and the 
rest of the world. To what extent does the positive association imply 
that more government  causes higher income? To what extent does it 
reflect  the fact that higher income leads to more government?  Or is the 
correlation  entirely coincidental, with no causation  in either direction? Joel Slemrod  377 
Figure  4. Expenditure  Ratio  versus GDP  Per Capita,  OECD Countries,  199Oa 
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Monetary  Fund  (1994).  Real  GDP  per  capita  is  from  version  5.6  of  the  data  in  Summers  and  Heston  (1991). 
a.  1988  figures  are  used  for  Iceland. 
It is certainly  logically possible that,  but  for the deleterious  economic 
effects of government,  real income would have been relatively higher 
in recent times,  and would have been relatively higher in high-tax 
countries.  It is conceivable that  if it were possible to measure  what  real 
income per capita would be in the presence  of minimal  government,  it 
would  lie above, and  be more  steeply sloping than,  the  best-fitting  curve 
of the points in figures  2-6.  The difference  between  the observed  points 
and the points for the minimal-government  scenario  would be the cost 
of government  involvement  which, according  to the hypothesis  that  the 
big-government  era has been a mistake, is increasing  with the tax-to- 
GDP ratio. 
Although  this is logically conceivable, I am not aware  of any serious 
academic study that purports to demonstrate a significant negative 
causal relationship  between the extent of government  involvement  and 
the level of prosperity.  There  are, however, studies  that  purport  to show 
a negative, and presumably  causal, relationship  between measures  of 378  Brookings  Papers on Economic  Activity,  2:1995 
Figure 5. Tax Ratio versus GDP Per Capita, All Countries, 1990a 
1985  dollars 
.  U.S.A. 
17,500  .  Canada 
* Switzerland  * Luxembourg 
15,000  -Australia  Germany  eNorway  *Sweden 
Japan  *  *France  * Denmark 
eU.K.  #Belgium 
12,500 -  *  Italy 
* Singapore  * New Zealand 
10,000  _  Spain 
* Cyprus 
7,500  *  . Portugal 
*Korea, Rep.  oGreece 
Venezuela-  * Mauritius 
.5,000  -.0  *  UHungary 
0  *  *Uruguay  e Poland  oCehsoai 
*Iran  South  Africa  *Seychelles  *Czechoslovakia 
2,  500  *  ***  PanamaZ.  ONamibia 
o  o  ;e  *India  *  Kenya  e  Lesotho  00  ~~~~#  O'D  I o  Kenya  I  ~~~~~~~~~~~~I  II 
0.1  0.2  0.3  0.4  0.5  0.6 
General  government  tax revenue/GDP 
Source: Tax ratio (general government tax revenue/GDP) is the author's calculation using data from International  Monetary 
Fund ( 1994). Real GDP per capita is from version 5.6 of the data in Summers and Heston ( 1991). 
a. 1989 figures are used for Barbados, Brazil, Guatemala, Iran, Japan, Peru, Seychelles,  Swaziland, Trinidad  and  Tobago, 
Yugoslavia,  and Zambia.  1988 figures are used for Chile,  Djibouti, Iceland, Liberia, Malawi, Poland, Sierra Leone, and 
Vanuatu. 
government  involvement  and  the growth  rate  of real per capita  income, 
most notably by Robert Barro.2 This claim is  made in the face of 
univariate  evidence that is hardly striking. Figures 7 and 8 show the 
raw evidence on the association between the annual average growth 
rate  for the period 1960-90 and two measures  of government  involve- 
ment, given as averages for the period 1970-90: the tax-to-GDP  ratio 
and the ratio of government  expenditures  to GDP. Figures 9 and 10 
repeat this exercise for the OECD countries alone. As Barro's work 
shows, in the presence of a reasonable set of conditioning variables 
there is,  in fact,  a significant negative partial association between 
growth and a measure of  government involvement. However, as is 
discussed further  below, this statistical association is not at all robust 
to reasonable  changes in the set of conditioning variables  or to other 
aspects of the empirical specification. 
If the cost of government  is so large, why is this cost so difficult to 
2.  Barro (1991b). Joel Slemrod  379 
Figure 6. Expenditure  Ratio versus GDP Per Capita, All Countries, 1990a 
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discern in time-series or cross-country studies? How robust are the 
findings about the deleterious effects of government  on growth rates, 
and how can they be reconciled with the time-series  and cross-country 
effects? This paper  addresses  these questions  by first  outlining  a model 
of the relationship  between prosperity  and the extent of government, 
emphasizing  the difficulty of identifying which of the causal mecha- 
nisms the data reveal. The size of government  is not exogenous, but 
chosen, and depends not only on tastes for government activity as 
reflected  through  the political process, but also on the expected benefit 
of government  spending and the cost of mobilizing resources  for that 
expenditure. 
The paper then reviews the empirical evidence on the relationship 
between the extent of government  and the level and growth  rate of per 
capita income, respectively. The literature  concerning  levels of pros- 
perity  focuses almost  exclusively on the determinants  of tax and  expen- 
diture  levels, occasionally distinguishing  the cost and demand  factors 
but never considering  the effect of government  activity on income. In 380  Brookings  Papers on Economic  Activity, 2:1995 
Figure 7. Tax Ratio versus Average  Real Growth  Rate 1970-90, All Countries 
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contrast, the growth literature studies the effect of government on 
growth. However, the empirical  findings  are not robust  to various  rea- 
sonable alternative  specifications and, of even more concern, do not 
address  the identification  problems  raised by the model described. 
The paper goes on to focus on the conceptual and measurement 
problems  that arise in the context of the relationship  between govern- 
ment and prosperity.  It argues that it is necessary to rethink  this rela- 
tionship, generalizing  several aspects of the underlying,  often implicit, 
model of the relationship  among government,  prosperity,  and growth. 
The resulting  model must recognize that the objectives of government 
policy can be achieved either  through  expenditure  and  tax programs,  or 
through  programs  (often economically similar)  that do not involve ex- 
penditure  of funds. The choice between  import  tariffs  and  (unauctioned) 
quotas  is a classic example, but  there  are  countless  others. Furthermore, 
within the class of tax programs,  many countries  have less-than-trans- 
parent  "safety valves" that reduce the effective marginal  rate  of taxa- 
tion on the most productive  members  of society. Joel Slemrod  381 
Figure 8. Expenditure  Ratio versus Average  Real Growth  Rate 1970-90, 
All Countries 
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(1991). 
In addition,  the model  must recognize  the multiple  ways  that indi- 
viduals  and institutions  can react to  a higher tax burden. Traditional 
models  that focus  on  individuals'  distorted  choices  of  labor supply, 
saving  and other consumption  decisions,  and firms' choices  of invest- 
ment leave out an important class  of individual responses  that include 
tax avoidance and evasion.  They also leave out the way in which insti- 
tutions, for example  in the labor market, adjust to high-tax regimes by 
mitigating,  although not eliminating,  their social  cost. 
A Structural  Model  of Government  Involvement  and 
Economic  Success 
I begin by focusing  on the level,  rather than the growth rate, of per 
capita income,  and by assuming that the government expends its money 
on a productive  public  good  whose  marginal benefit initially  exceeds 382  Brookings  Papers on Economic  Activity, 2:1995 
Figure 9. Tax Ratio versus Average  Real Growth  Rate 1970-90, OECD Countries 
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the marginal  social cost of raising  funds, but after  some level falls short 
of the marginal  cost. Let YO  be per capita income in the absence of 
government  spending and taxation, which is a function of the endow- 
ment of physical and human  capital as well as natural  resources;  let Y 
be actual  per capita income; and let G be government  spending  and  tax 
revenues as a ratio to national income. Figure 11 illustrates  the rela- 
tionship  between Y and G for two different  assumptions  about  the cost 
of government, showing that Y is maximized at G* or GB, depending 
on how costly it is to raise funds. 
The objective is to measure  the curve of figure 11. However, what 
is actually observed in (G,Y) space from a cross-section of countries 
depends on what varies across countries. To investigate that issue, 
assume that in any country G is determined  by equating  the marginal 
benefit (MB) of the government  spending  with its marginal  cost (MC). 
Then consider the case in which all countries  have the same value of 
YO,  as well as the same MB and  MC curves. In this case the only source 
of variation  is optimization  error,  observed  points would lie in a cluster Joel Slemrod  383 
Figure 10. Expenditure  Ratio versus Average  Real Growth  Rate 1970-90, 
OECD Countries 
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around  point C in figure 11, and the closest-fitting line would reveal 
nothing about  the YoA  curve. 
Now imagine  that  countries  also differ in the marginal  cost of raising 
funds for government  expenditure;  perhaps  for political reasons, some 
countries  have access to relatively efficient tax structures  and  others  do 
not. The higher-cost  country  would  have a curve  such as YoB  and  would, 
if optimizing, choose GB; it would have a smaller government  as well 
as lower income. The scatter  plot of observed (G,Y) pairs would have 
a positive slope that  was unrelated  to the relationship  between Y and G 
for any given country. Exactly the same reasoning  applies if countries 
vary in the height of their MB curve; countries  with a higher  MB will 
choose a higher G, and will also have higher Y. 
So far the demand  for government  has been tightly  tied to productive 
public goods. The story is altered  if the government  expenditure  is not 
for productive  infrastructure  but rather, for transfer  payments, social 
insurance, or other services that do not contribute  to national  income 
(although  they may add to social welfare). Demand  for these services, 384  Brookings  Papers on Economic  Activity, 2:1995 
Figure 11. Y and G for Different  Costs of Government,  When G Can Be Productive 
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mediated  by the political process, is now represented  by MD, and G is 
chosen by equating MD and MC, although the marginal benefit of 
spending  is not reflected  in higher  Y.3 For any given G, Y is lower than 
YO  by the social cost of raising funds. Note, though, that  when govern- 
ment spending is not productive, cross-country  variations  in MD will 
result in the scatter  plot of points lying around  the YoA  curve, which is 
common to all countries  when YO  and MC do not vary. 
The nature  of cross-country  variations  in YO  is crucial. To the extent 
that  they are uncorrelated  with MD, MC, and optimization  error,  these 
variations  add noise to the relationship  between Y and G. But the rela- 
tionship is unlikely to be so benign. There is, for example, substantial 
evidence that suggests that the demand  for government  services has an 
income elasticity in excess of one. Commonly  known  as Wagner's  law, 
3.  Modeling  an optimizing  government  does not presume  that  the size of government 
is chosen to maximize some measure  of social welfare. Even a Leviathan  desiring to 
maximize net revenue would arguably  collect less when the costs of collection were 
higher. Joel Slemrod  385 
Figure 12. Y and G for Different  Levels  of Potential  Income 
y 
G 
Source: Author's model as described in text. 
this is illustrated  in figure 12, where the country  with a higher YO  also 
chooses a higher  value of G, because  of higher  demand  for government. 
The elasticity of MC with respect to G determines  how much of the 
higher YO  translates  to higher Y. If MC is inelastic, then G and its cost 
increase by little and most of the increase in YO  yields a higher Y. 
However  if MC is quite elastic, then a higher  YO  corresponds  to a greatly 
expanded  government  sector and its attendant  costs; it is even conceiv- 
able that the country  with a higher YO  ends up with a G that is so much 
larger  that its Y is actually lower (C compared  to A). In any case, it is 
clear that the scatter plot of points does not trace out the relationship 
between Y and G. 
There is  also evidence that the cost of raising funds, relative to 
income, is lower for more  developed countries.  This situation  is shown 
in figure 13, where the country with a higher level of YO  also has a 
flatter  curve. Even ignoring  the impact  of YO  on MD, the richer  country 
will choose a larger government  sector; how much bigger depends on 386  Brookings  Papers on Economic  Activity, 2:1995 





Source: Author's miiodel  as described in text. 
the elasticity of MB with respect to G. As in the previous examples, 
connecting the points A and B provides no information  about  the cost 
of G for a given country.  Moreover,  the total  efficiency costs of taxation 
may be higher or lower in country  A as compared  to country  B, de- 
pending  on the elasticity of MD. 
These relationships can be summarized  by positing two structural 
relationships  between Y and G. The first is the determination  of G, 
which is modeled here as the maximization  of the net benefits of G, 
that is,  by setting equal the marginal demand and marginal cost of 
government  spending, where 
(1)  MC=a,  +  a,G  +  a2Y+  a3Z, 
and 
(2)  MD  =bo+  blG  +  b2Y+  b3ZD. Joel Slemrod  387 
To clarify matters,  MC is defined  to be cost of government  involvement 
net of any productivity-enhancing  aspects  of public goods or infrastruc- 
ture;  thus MC can be negative for some levels of G. MD is interpreted 
as the marginal  demand  for government  activities that are not directly 
reflected  in GDP. As suggested by the previous discussion, it is likely 
that  a, is greater  than  zero, a2 is less than  zero, b, is less than  zero, and 
b2 is greater  than zero. Zc and ZD are vectors of exogenous variables 
(which may be somewhat  overlapping)  that  affect MC and  MD, respec- 
tively.  Equating MD and MC yields the equilibrium  value of G as 
follows: 
(3)  G*  =  [1I(a,  -  b,)]  [(bo'  -  a,)  +  (b2 -  a2)Y +  b3ZD -  a3Zc], 
or 
(4)  G* =  co  + clY  +  C2ZD  +  C3ZC 
where cl  =  (b2 -  a2)I(a, -  b1) >  0. 
There is a substantial  literature  concerned  with estimating  versions 
of equation 4.  In some cases the dependent  variable is a measure of 
government  spending, sometimes disaggregated  by type of spending. 
In others the dependent  variable  is a measure  of taxes, sometimes dis- 
aggregated  by type of tax. A wide range of exogenous variables  other 
than  income has been considered, arising  from disparate  theories  about 
the determination  of the size of government. With only a few excep- 
tions, there  has been little attempt  to extricate  the parameters  of the MC 
and MD relationships from estimates of c1. This would require the 
isolation of variables found in Zc but not in ZD,  and vice versa. The 
problem at hand, however, is to disentangle  equation  4 from another 
relationship  linking Y and G. Integrating  the marginal  cost from equa- 
tion 1 yields 
(5)  C  =  a* +  aoG +  (a1/2)G2 +  a2YG +  a3ZcG. 
C represents  the total cost of government,  net of the benefits  of govern- 
ment spending reflected in GDP. Actual income is, by construction, 
equal to potential income minus these costs, so that 
(6)  Y=  YO-  C 
-  YO  -  [a* +  aoG +  (a /2)G2  +  a2YG +  a3ZcG]. 388  Brookings  Papers on Economic  Activity, 2:1995 





Source: Author's model as described in text. 
Positing that  potential  income is a linear  function  of a vector  of endow- 
ments denoted  W, so that 
(7)  YO  =  do +  diW, 
then the following relationship  links Y and G: 
(8)  Y =  do +  djW  -  [a.  +  aoG +  (a112)G2  +  a2YG +  a3ZcG], 
or 
(9)  Y  =  1/(1  +  a2G)  {do  +  djW 
-  [a.  +  aoG +  (a,/2)G2 +  a3ZcG]}. 
To investigate the net cost of government  it is important  to under- 
stand equation 9; in particular,  it must be statistically distinguished 
from the relationship  between G and Y expressed in equation  4. The 
two are depicted in figure 14, where the relationship  between G and Y Joel Slemrod  389 
from  equation  4 is labeled E, for equilibrium,  and  that  from  equation  9 
is labeled C, for cost. 
The best hope for estimating equation  9 is to find variables  that are 
contained in ZD  but not in Zc. These determinants  of the "demand" 
for government  will shift the E curve but not the C curve, thus tracing 
out the C curve. As discussed further  below, finding  any such variable 
is problematic.  In the absence  of such variables  it is impossible  to know 
how to interpret  scatter  plots like those of figures  3-6  because they do 
not, by themselves, clearly reveal the cost, if any, of government  ac- 
tivity. More sophisticated  analysis is required. 
Empirical Analyses of the Relationship between 
Government and Prosperity 
There  is a vast empirical  literature  investigating  the relationship  be- 
tween the extent of government  and the level of prosperity.  Little of it 
makes any reference at all to the structural  relationships  that link the 
two; an exception is the work of Bruce Bolnick, who analyzes tax 
patterns  across countries in a simultaneous  model, including demand 
factors such as the dependency ratio and per capita income and also 
supply factors proxying for the ease of tax collection.4  No one has had 
the temerity  to regress  Y  against  a set of variables  that  includes  measures 
of G, perhaps  because  of the daunting  challenge  of identifying  variables 
in the vector W,  and perhaps also because of the courage needed to 
assert  that  no important  unmeasured  influences  on Y  would  be correlated 
with G.5 
There have, however, been scores of empirical studies by econo- 
mists, political scientists, and sociologists that try to explain G or the 
growth  of G, some of which include Y as a regressor.  The conceptual 
models underlying the studies vary widely; the following discussion 
gives only a flavor of the approaches. 
Writing in 1883, Adolph Wagner proposed the law of expanding 
state activity, which, in modern  terminology, posits that citizens' de- 
mand for government-provided  goods and services is income-elastic, 
4.  See Bolnick (1978). 
5.  As discussed below, the growth  of Y has quite often been regressed  on G, espe- 
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due  to the "pressure  for social progress" and  the need for infrastructure 
investments.  Jack  Peacock and  Jack  Wiseman  stress instead  the impor- 
tance of crises such as war and depressions, arguing  that the greater 
role of government  during  these times increases  the tolerable  burden  of 
taxation.  This remains  high after  the crisis has passed, both  because  the 
expanded  bureaucracy  is better able to assert its interests  and because 
war, in particular,  concentrates  power  at the national  level. This theory, 
however, is unable to explain the large rise in the role of the public 
sector after World War II.  William Baumol argues that the labor- 
intensive nature of government services, with the attendant  lagging 
productivity  growth, implies that  their  relative  price  is bound  to increase 
over time. As a result, the share of government  in GDP will increase, 
as long as demand  is less than unit-elastic.6 
Another  set of theories has emphasized  the political mechanism  that 
maps individuals' preferences  into outcomes. One example is the col- 
lective choice model, in which politicians  cater  to the median  voter, as 
illustrated  by Theodore  Bergstrom  and Robert  Goodman.  James  Buch- 
anan  and Richard  Wagner  argue  that, because of its nature  as a public 
good and its uncertain  benefits, much of government  spending  will be 
provided  suboptimally  unless the tax burden  is concealed by means of 
value added or sales taxes, creating a "fiscal illusion." William Nis- 
kanen stresses the role of bureaucracies  that value larger  budgets and 
have the power to extract budget dollars from the legislature. Samuel 
Peltzman  argues  that  the incentive to redistribute  wealth  politically, not 
the demand  for public goods, is the most important  determinant  of the 
relative size and growth of government, and that the growth of the 
middle class has been a major source of government  growth in the 
developed world since 1930.7 
The eminent public finance  economists Richard  Goode and Richard 
Musgrave  note the high positive correlation,  over time and  across  coun- 
tries, between  GDP per capita  and  total tax ratios.8  Goode suggests that 
rather  than income being the driving  factor, this correlation  may result 
from  the positive correlation  between  per  capita  income and  other  social 
and economic conditions that make direct taxes acceptable  and effec- 
6.  See Wagner  (1883), Peacock and Wiseman  (1961), and Baumol  (1967). 
7.  See Bergstrom  and Goodman  (1973), Buchanan  and Wagner  (1977), Niskanen 
(1971), and Peltzman  (1980). 
8.  See Goode (1968) and Musgrave  (1969). Joel Slemrod  391 
tive, such as a high level of literacy, wide use of standard  accounting 
methods, effective public administration,  and political stability. 
A recent example of this empirical literature  is the work of Vito 
Tanzi, who investigates the determinants  of the share  of tax in GDP in 
eighty-three  developing countries for several years during  the period 
1978-88.9  By itself, the log of per  capita  income  is positively associated 
with the tax ratio, although  both the estimated  coefficient and its asso- 
ciated t statistics are less than half their size in the 1988 regression 
compared  to the 1978 regression. He goes on to show that the share  of 
agricultural  output  in total GDP, an important  element  of the Z4 vector, 
explains  more  of the variation  in tax shares  than  does per  capita  income 
and has a negative sign. Where  both variables  are included, per capita 
income  no longer  has a significant  positive effect, although  the negative 
effect of  the agricultural  share survives; as Tanzi notes, these two 
variables  are highly negatively correlated. 
The results of Goode and Tanzi can be restated  in the language of 
the model presented  above. They observe that c,Y from equation  4 is 
positive. They ascribe  this not to a positive value of b2,  but  to a negative 
value of a2. However, they suggest that  the negative value of a2 would 
fall to zero, or close to zero, if the elements of Zc, conditions that 
facilitate the use of efficient means of efficient tax regimes that are 
highly positively correlated with Y, could be adequately measured. 
They do not consider any feedback effect of G on Y, such as that in 
equation  6. 
Empirical Analyses of the Relationship between the Growth of 
Government and Income Growth 
In recent years there has been an explosion of top-down, cross- 
country  studies of the impact of government  taxation  and expenditure. 
There are two striking differences between the recent crop of studies 
and those surveyed above. First, the G variable  is always on the right- 
hand, rather  than left-hand, side of the regression  equation, and little 
or no attention  is paid to how it is determined.  Thus equation  6, alone, 
is investigated, without reference to equation 4.  Second, in all cases 
9.  See Tanzi (1992). 392  Brookings  Papers on Economic  Activity, 2:1995 
the dependent  variable of equation 6 is a measure, not of the level of 
prosperity  but rather,  of its rate of growth. 
The switch in emphasis  from levels of prosperity  to growth  rates  has 
roots in both theoretical  developments  and  frustration  with the practical 
problems  of level equations. To convincingly extract the relationship 
between G and Y from an equation  like equation  9 requires  specifying 
the W vector well enough that no factors systematically  related to G 
are  omitted. Given the complexity  of factors  that  determine  the "wealth 
of nations," this is problematic.  If, though, many of the determinants 
of prosperity are country-specific and time-invariant,  then it seems 
worthwhile  to investigate  the determinants  of the change  in income  over 
time; if the natural  specification is in growth rates, then equation 9 
should have the change in the logarithm  of Y on the left-hand  side and 
a measure  of the change in G over a comparable  period on the right- 
hand  side. This relationship  is plotted in figures 15-18 for both tax and 
expenditure  ratios, in all countries and in OECD countries  only. Eye- 
balling does not reveal any striking  relationships,  although  there  seems 
to be a positive relationship  in figure 15 and a negative one in figure 
18. A more negative relationship  would be expected for expenditures 
because, in the short run, poor economic performance  will  trigger 
higher social insurance  payouts. 
That  the recent literature  has not pursued  fixed effect, cross-country 
models is certainly also due to theoretical  developments, in particular 
the new growth theory. The new growth theory is best understood  in 
contrast  to the old growth theory, represented  by the model of Robert 
Solow. 10  In that  model, the steady-state  level of income depends  on the 
rate  of saving (presumed  to equal investment,  as in a closed economy), 
but the rate of growth of per capita income depends  on the exogenous 
rate of technological progress. An increase in the rate of saving (and 
by assumption, investment) initially increases the economy's growth 
rate as it moves toward the new, higher, equilibrium  capital-to-labor 
ratio, but in the new steady state the growth  rate returns  to its techno- 
logically determined  level. A key element of this model is that capital 
is subject to diminishing  returns. 
In the new models of growth  reproducible  capital, sometimes  broadly 
defined to include both physical and human  capital, exhibits constant 
10. See Solow (1956). Figure 15. Change in Tax Ratio 1970-74 to 1985-89 versus Average 
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returns  to scale. One class of models achieves this by introducing  ex- 
ternal effects of capital either because, as in that of Robert Lucas, 
human  capital makes other workers more productive  or, as in that of 
Paul  Romer, the aggregate  stock of knowledge  provides  an externality. 
Another  class of model, due to Sergio Rebelo, posits that all inputs  to 
the production  process are some form of reproducible  capital, and that 
output  can be expressed as a linear function of this broad concept of 
capital. These models share the implication  that, because there are no 
diminishing  returns  to capital accumulation,  a constant  rate of invest- 
ment, by increasing  the capital stock, steadily increases  output.  A one- 
time increase in the investment-to-output  ratio therefore  increases the 
economy's growth rate forever because it increases the rate of capital 
accumulation  forever.  "I 
The policy implications  are clear. The welfare consequences  of any 
influence  on the accumulation  of capital  or the stock of knowledge  loom 
much larger  than in old growth models. And as William Easterly and 
Rebelo point out, "it is hard  to think  of an influence  on the private  real 
rate of return  and on the growth rate that is more direct than that of 
income taxes. If these do not affect the rate of growth, what does?"'2 
Robert King and Rebelo offer a striking example of the theoretical 
potency of income taxes.  13 They simulate  the effects of increasing  the 
income tax rate from 20 percent  to 30 percent;  this lowers the after-tax 
return  to capital accumulation, and the saving rate. By lowering the 
growth rate from 2.00 percent to 0.37 percent, the loss in welfare is 
equivalent  to a permanent  drop of 65 percent in real consumption.  In 
the Solow model, the same tax experiment  causes a welfare loss equiv- 
alent to a permanent  drop of 1.6 percent  in real consumption. 
The  combination  of new theories  of growth  and  the recent  availability 
of an abundance  of comparable  cross-country  data, due to the work of 
Robert  Summers  and  Alan Heston, triggered  a renaissance  of empirical 
studies of the determinants  of growth. In the most influential  of these 
studies, Barro examines a cross-section of ninety-eight countries for 
the period 1960-85 and, among other concerns, investigates  how eco- 
nomic growth  is affected by government  expenditures,  measured  as the 
ratio  of real government  consumption  purchases  less spending  on edu- 
1  1. See Lucas (1988), Romer  (1990), and Rebelo (1991). 
12. Easterly  and Rebelo (1993, p. 418). 
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cation and defense  to real GDP,  denoted gC/y.  He finds a significantly 
negative  association  between  this government  expenditure  variable,  av- 
eraged  over the period 1970-85, and  real growth  over the period 1960- 
85; there is  also a negative association with private, but not total, 
investment. Even when the investment  ratio is held constant, the rela- 
tion between government  expenditure  is negative. Barro  suggests that 
one interpretation  of these findings is that government  consumption 
introduces  distortions, such as high tax rates, but does not provide an 
offsetting stimulus  to investment  and growth.'4 
Charles  Plosser identifies taxes on income and profits  as a growth- 
depressing  factor.  '5 He compares  real per capita  growth  rates  with total 
tax revenues on income and profits as a share of GDP in twenty-four 
OECD  countries  for the period 1960-89.  He calculates  the correlation 
coefficient to be  -0.52  and indicates that an increase in the average 
tax rate  of 0.05 percent  is associated  with a decline in the annual  growth 
rate of slightly more than 0.4 percentage  point. Although  Plosser cau- 
tions that "it  would be wrong to take these simple correlations as 
evidence of causation," he also asserts that "this sort of information 
is suggestive and  important  for understanding  various  factors  related  to 
long-run  growth."''6 
Thus in contrast  to the empirical literature  on taxes and prosperity, 
there  are  empirical  analyses  that  purport  to show a negative  relationship 
between  the level of government  involvement  and  the growth  rate, and 
that  suggest that  the causation  runs  from  government  to growth.  Several 
recent  studies have demonstrated  that  this negative association  is by no 
means robust  to reasonable  alternative  formulations. 
Ross Levine and David Renelt examine whether  the conclusions of 
cross-country  growth  regressions  are robust  or fragile to small changes 
in the conditioning  information  set, using a variant  of Edward  Leamer's 
extreme-bounds  analysis.'7 They conclude that "only by selecting a 
very particular  conditioning set can one identify a significant partial 
correlation"  between the growth rate of real per capita GDP over the 
period 1960-89 and the ratio  of government  consumption  expenditures 
14. See Summers  and Heston (1991) and Barro  (1991b). 
15. See Plosser (1992). 
16. Plosser (1992, pp. 78-80). 
17. See Levine and Renelt (1992). Joel Slemrod  397 
to GDP.  8 Nor is there a robust relationship  between growth and the 
ratio  of total government  expenditures  to GDP, or between growth  and 
government  consumption  expenditures  excluding  education  and  defense 
expenditures,  which is the measure  of government  economic involve- 
ment used by Barro; the coefficient on Barro's government  variable 
becomes insignificant  when Levine and Renelt include the ratio of ex- 
ports to GDP and the standard  deviation of domestic credit growth in 
the conditioning  set.  '9 Nor are disaggregated  measures  of government 
activity-the  ratio to GDP of government  capital formation, govern- 
ment  education  expenditures,  and government  defense expenditures- 
robustly  correlated  with growth rates. Moreover, none of these fiscal 
policy indicators is robustly correlated  with the investment share of 
GDP, one of the few variables  that survives the extreme-bounds  anal- 
ysis test of a robust  relationship  with growth. 
Jonas Agell, Thomas Lindh, and Henry Ohlsson also conclude that 
the relationship  between growth and the ratio of taxes or expenditures 
to GDP is not robust.  Focusing on the OECD  countries  only, they show 
that simply adding  two demographic  variables  concerning  dependency 
ratios (the fraction of  the population younger than fifteen, and the 
fraction  older than sixty-four) to the estimating  equation  is enough to 
turn a negative partial relationship between growth and government 
into a positive, albeit insignificant,  one.20 
Easterly  and Rebelo perform  a careful  analysis of the effect of fiscal 
policy on economic growth, using several different  measures  of fiscal 
policy. They find that measures  of the level of taxes tend to be insig- 
nificant in Barro's type of growth rate regression, often causing the 
coefficient  on initial  income  to become statistically  insignificant  as well. 
The authors  ascribe this finding to the strong positive correlation  be- 
tween their fiscal variables and the initial (1960) level of per capita 
income, making  it difficult to disentangle  the effects of fiscal variables 
from  those of the initial level of income. This is the convergence  effect 
discussed  by Barro  and  Xavier  Sala-i-Martin,  and  others.  Of the thirteen 
tax variables  they investigate, only one is (barely) significant  at the 5 
18. Levine and Renelt (1992, p. 951). 
19. See Barro  (1991b). 
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percent  level-the  "marginal" income tax computed  with individual 
country  time series to regress income tax revenue  on GDP.21 
Easterly and Rebelo argue that the same problem applies to the 
negative correlation  between growth  and the income tax share  of GDP 
among  OECD  countries  presented  by Plosser-when  the initial level of 
income is controlled  for, the negative relation  between these two vari- 
ables disappears.22  They conclude that, in contrast  to the robustness  of 
theoretical  predictions, "the evidence that tax rates matter  for growth 
is disturbingly  fragile."23 
Jean-Louis  Arcand  and Marcel  Dagenais explore the implications  of 
errors  in the variables commonly used in cross-country  regressions.24 
Rather  than using ordinary  least squares (OLS), they use a "higher- 
moments" estimator  that they claim is robust, under  quite reasonable 
assumptions,  to errors  in variables.  They highlight  equation  1 of Barro's 
study, in which their reestimation of the OLS coefficient  on gc/y yields 
-0.0818,  with a standard  error  of 0.0226.  Using their estimator,  this 
coefficient is -0.03  19, with a standard  error  of 0.0510. They conclude 
that "while this does not mean that the government  consumption  ex- 
penditures  have no negative impact on the growth rate, it does raise 
doubts about the  'stylized  fact'  proposed  by Barro .  .  . and suggests 
that more carefully constructed  data on government  consumption  ex- 
penditures  is needed before one can pronounce  oneself one way or the 
other.'  '25  Moreover, with their estimator  the effect of gc/y  on the in- 
vestment ratio becomes less negative, and in two versions of Barro's 
specification  it becomes positive and  statistically  significant  at the usual 
levels of confidence. 
Even this cursory  review makes clear that the partial  cross-country 
association between growth and measures  of government  involvement 
is not robust  to several aspects of the empirical  specification.  This may 
not be too surprising, given the difficult problems of measuring  the 
extent of government  involvement which are discussed further,  below. 
There  is a striking  contrast  between  the statistical  explorations  of the 
relationship  between G and the level of Y and  those that  investigate  the 
21.  See Easterly and Rebelo (1993,  pp. 426-27),  and Barro and Sala-i-Martin 
(1992). 
22.  See Plosser (1992). 
23.  Easterly  and Rebelo (1993, p. 442). 
24.  See Arcand  and Dagenais (1994). 
25.  Arcand  and Dagenais (1994, p. 19) on Barro  (1991b). Joel Slemrod  399 
link between G and the growth rate of Y. The level studies primarily 
try to explain G and often include Y as one explanatory  variable;  that 
G might affect Y is ignored, as is (with some exceptions) the structural 
interpretation  of the effect of Y  on G. The growth  studies try to explain 
the growth  rate of Y (henceforth  AY) and often include G as one of the 
explanatory  variables.  The possibility of a structural  relationship  deter- 
mining G is often completely ignored. 
Barro's  work  is a clear exception to the last statement,  as it addresses 
sorne  of the issues raised  in describing  the model above.26  Although  the 
conceptual  model underpinning  Barro's  empirical  analysis is quite dif- 
ferent, the statistical issues can be illustrated  using the model given 
here. First, he recognizes that  if governments  are  optimizing  and  coun- 
tries differ only in the relative productivity  of government  services, 
then the covariation  between G and AY  does not correspond  to a rela- 
tionship like equation 9 and "there would not be much cross-country 
relation  between growth rates and the size of government.  "27 
This problem  leads Barro  to the effect of government  consumption 
expenditures,  which, in his model, should  unambiguously  lead to lower 
growth  rates because they do not enter private  production  functions.28 
He then argues  that  in this case the remaining  problem  of interpretation 
stems from Wagner's law-that  higher levels of income lead to an 
increase  in g'/y.29  Given  the initial  level  of  income,  a higher growth 
rate  leads to higher  average  income over the sample  and  hence, a higher 
value of  g'/y.  This  amounts to recognizing  the problem of  separately 
identifying  equations  4 and  6. Barro  concludes  that  spurious  correlation 
associated with Wagner's law is a problem  for government  transfers, 
but not for government  consumption, investment, or education  expen- 
ditures, and he therefore  enters measures  of these activities separately 
into a growth  rate  regression.30  This conclusion  about  potential  spurious 
correlation  rests on the finding that only for transfers  for social insur- 
ance and welfare (out of five spending categories) does the level of 
income in 1960 account for a substantial  fraction  of the cross-country 
26.  See Barro  (1991a). 
27.  Barro  (1991a, p. 278). 
28.  See Barro  (1991b). 
29.  See Barro  (199la). 
30.  If the reason that government expenditures have negative economic conse- 
quences is the taxes that are required  to support  them, then the total cost (deadweight 
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variance  in the spending  ratio;  however, both  government  consumption 
and education  expenses are significantly  correlated  with per capita in- 
come in 1960; negatively and positively, respectively. 
This exercise in no way disposes of the problems  of interpreting  the 
coefficient in a growth equation  on a measure  of government  involve- 
ment, because even for nonproductive  expenditures  there  is likely to be 
a relationship  between the optimal size of government  and the contri- 
bution to prosperity  of government. Alternatively if,  as most public 
finance  economists have concluded, there are important  cross-country 
differences in the cost of mobilizing resources for government, then 
unmeasured  variation in this factor will cause the scatter plot not to 
approximate  the C curve of figure 14. This will be true as long as the 
level of government  activity chosen by a country  depends  on the eco- 
nomic  cost of mobilizing  resources  to fund  the activity, a weak  assertion 
indeed. What  is required  is to create  an instrument  for G using indicators 
of MD, that is, elements of the vector ZD that are not also in Zc. As 
stated earlier, this is a difficult task because many of the obvious ele- 
ments of ZD, such as the extent of urbanization,  are also found in Zc. 
Because these issues have not yet been dealt with adequately,  it is 
not advisable to interpret  the estimated coefficient on a G variable to 
represent  the cost of government.3'  Moreover, there are further  prob- 
lems of interpretation  because  many  of the key variables  in the W vector 
are also likely to be in the Zc vector. Consider  measures  of the human 
capital endowment of a country, the critical element of several new 
growth  models. In a more prosaic vein, a more educated  citizenry is a 
key requirement  for implementing  arguably  more efficient direct (in- 
come) taxes; in other words, more human  capital (H) not only raises Y0 
because it is an element of W, but also reduces MC because it is an 
element of Zc. The coefficient on H in a reduced-form  equation ex- 
plaining  Y, or AY, reflects  not only its direct  effect on potential  income 
through  W, but also the fact that higher  H reduces the slope of the C 
curve and shifts the E curve to the right, which has an additional  effect 
on Y, of ambiguous  sign. 
31.  Engen and Skinner (1992), noting potential  problems  of endogeneity, use in- 
struments  for fiscal policy variables  (the change  in tax and  expenditure  shares),  but  make 
no attempt  to differentiate  the Zc vector from the ZD vector and, in fact, explicitly 
include  as instruments  variables  measuring  the ease of tax collection, such  as the literacy 
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This review of the existing cross-country  literature  suggests  that  there 
is no persuasive evidence that the extent of government  has either a 
positive or a negative impact on either the level or the growth rate of 
per capita income, largely because the fundamental  problems  of iden- 
tification  have not yet been adequately  addressed.  This does not imply 
that  there are no examples of programs  or taxes that  do have an impor- 
tant effect; bottom-up  studies must be the source of such conclusions. 
The next section investigates some conceptual  issues that  arise in relat- 
ing the bottom-up  and top-down studies of the effect of taxes on eco- 
nomic outcomes. It explores the possible reasons  why top-down  studies 
might find a negligible effect, and whether  this finding is compatible 
with a significant  behavioral  response to tax disincentives. 
Reassessing the Relationship between Government and 
Prosperity 
One possible explanation  for a negligible aggregate  relationship  be- 
tween the level of government  and prosperity  is that the compensated 
behavioral  response, and therefore  distortion, due to the relative price 
changes caused by taxes is not very large. This is not the place to 
review the vast bottom-up  empirical  literature,  but it is fair to say that 
there  remains  substantial  controversy  about  such key parameters  as the 
compensated  elasticity of labor  supply  or savings. Most of the empirical 
evidence is based on data from developed countries. In that context it 
might seem that  the two large tax changes in the United States, in 1981 
and 1986, would have helped to pin down the critical parameters,  but 
this has not proven to be true. My own reading  of the evidence is that 
the experience  of the 1980s suggests that  these real elasticities are  quite 
close to zero, although  there is certainly  evidence that  particular  kinds 
of real behavior  are highly responsive to taxation.32 
Assar Lindbeck  argues  that  the disincentive  effects of high taxes are 
large  but delayed primarily,  but not only, because  habits, social norms, 
attitudes, and ethics restrict the influence of economic incentives on 
economic  behavior,  and  because  individuals  only gradually  stop  follow- 
ing existing habits and norms. Thus he surmises  that serious disincen- 
32.  See Slemrod  (1992). 402  Brookings  Papers on Economic  Activity, 2:1995 
tive effects may emerge only in a long-run  perspective, and are partic- 
ularly likely to occur when a new generation  enters working life and 
forms its values on the basis of a new incentive structure.33 
It is also possible that significant  effects of government  actually  do 
exist but, in practice, are impossible to isolate due to inadequate  data. 
This is the stance adopted by Levine and Renelt, who conclude that 
studies have not "produced  robust  empirical  relationships." Although 
they note that this might be because governments are providing an 
optimal amount  of public goods, they blame "inadequate  measures  of 
the delivery of public goods or our failure  to capture  the relevant  char- 
acteristics  of national  tax systems," and  stress  the necessity of studying 
data on the composition of government  expenditures  and the structure 
of the tax system, although  such data are not readily available.34 
Measurement  problems do make cross-country  analyses very diffi- 
cult. These problems  are in some cases conceptual, and in some cases 
relate  to the poor quality  of the data  purporting  to measure  a fairly clear 
concept. With regard  to the latter  issue, the empirical  investigator  can 
perhaps  do little other than weight apparently  less reliable data less 
heavily, in the manner of Eric Engen and Jonathan  Skinner.35  The 
conceptual  issues are worth  greater  attention. 
An immediate  problem  is how to measure  the value of the goods and 
services provided  by government.  National income accounts  generally 
value them at cost, since there are no market  prices to refer to.36  Na- 
tional income accounts make no attempt  to value the leisure time of a 
country's  residents, even though it is clear that individuals  themselves 
place a value on their leisure. Among other things, this means that 
income comparisons  will overstate the welfare cost of government  in- 
volvement that tends to reduce labor supply (that is, increase  leisure). 
A similar, but slightly different, issue relates to the quality of the 
environment.  This does not enter  into national  income, which therefore 
reflects only the cost of government  programs  designed to improve  it. 
The difference between environmental  quality and leisure is that in- 
creasing the former reflects an explicit policy goal, while increasing 
33.  See Lindbeck  (1995). 
34.  Both quotes from Levine and Renelt (1991, p. 34). 
35.  See Engen and Skinner  (1992). 
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the latter represents an unintended consequence of other goals that 
require  tax revenue. 
Environmental  quality is only one example of a social goal whose 
achievement  is not reflected  in standard  measures  of national  income.37 
It is widely accepted that redistributional  programs  exact some cost in 
terms of reduced incentives to work. Measures of economic success 
based on average income do not capture the degree to which such 
programs  succeed, although  they capture,  with error,  the costs that  they 
engender. The same can be said of social insurance  programs,  whose 
objective is to reduce the uncertainty  of citizens faced with risks that 
are not adequately  handled  by private  insurance  markets.  Measures  of 
national  income are  likely to capture  the costs that  accompany  the moral 
hazard  of social insurance,  albeit imperfectly,  but they certainly  do not 
account  for the reduction  in uncertainty  that they allow. 
There are many arbitrary  conventions of  government budgeting 
which can make economically equivalent  programs  appear  to represent 
different  levels of government  involvement in different  countries. For 
example, both France  and the United States have policies that provide 
net fiscal benefits to families with more children. In France this is 
accomplished by a direct payment to families, which increases with 
family size. In the United States it is accomplished  primarily  by grant- 
ing an exemption  for each dependent,  which is a deduction  from  taxable 
income. The budgeting  rules will portray  France  with higher  taxes and 
expenditures  than the United States, although  there may be no signifi- 
cant difference between the two policies. 
A much  more  difficult  problem  is that  many  of the important  avenues 
by which government  affects the economy have little or no budgetary 
consequence. Consider such critical aspects of policy as the enforce- 
ment  of property  rights, competition  and  regulation  policies, the extent 
of government  enterprise,  minimum  wage rules, and  trade  restrictions. 
These nonbudgetary  aspects  of government  economic  involvement  have 
the potential to introduce  bias into any observed relationship  between 
prosperity  or growth and the level of measured  government  activity. 
The direction  of the bias is not, a priori, clear. It could be that  there is 
37.  Another  example is the provision  of health  care  to the elderly. To the extent  that 
it is successful in increasing longevity, it can decrease income per capita because it 
increases  a country's dependency ratio. I thank Shlomo Yitzhaki for suggesting this 
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a positive correlation  between measured  and unmeasured  government 
involvement; governments that cannot keep their hands out of  one 
cookie barrel  cannot keep their hands  out of the other. If both kinds of 
policies have negative economic impact, then any estimate will over- 
state the association  between budgetary  costs and  prosperity  because it 
is also reflecting  the effects of the nonbudgetary  policies. 
It is also plausible that there is a negative correlation  between the 
measured  and unmeasured  components  of government;  those countries 
that, for whatever reason, are unable make use of explicit tax and 
expenditure  policies may resort  to other means. In this case there may 
be little or no statistical association between growth or prosperity  and 
measured  government  involvement, even though there is, in fact, an 
association  between growth  or prosperity  and  the total level of involve- 
ment, whether  budgetary  or not. 
In some cases it is possible to obtain a rough measure  of economic 
policies that do not show up in government budgets. For example, 
Easterly constructs  a dummy variable  equal to one if the real interest 
rate is less than -5  percent, as an index of inefficient financial  regu- 
lation, and another  variable equal to the variance  of the log of input 
prices, as a measure of price distortions.38  I calculate that across all 
countries each of these two measures of government  involvement is 
strongly  negatively correlated  with either  the total expenditure-to-GDP 
ratio (-0.30  and -0.44,  respectively) or the total tax-to-GDP ratio 
(-0.30  and -0.49,  respectively). From this it is clear that high-tax 
countries  are less likely to be engaged in counterproductive  nonbudg- 
etary economic policies; thus analyses that omit measures  of the non- 
budgetary  policies will tend to underestimate  any negative impact  that 
the budgetary  policies might have on prosperity.39 
Another  potentially  important  aspect  of government  involvement  in- 
volves a country's openness to the world economy. For example, Jef- 
frey Sachs and Andrew Warner  argue that trade liberalization  is the 
sine qua non of the overall reform  process and is an accurate  gauge of 
a country's  reform  program.40  They develop a one-zero  dummy  variable 
38.  Easterly  (1993). 
39.  Robert  Hall suggests that  there  is likely also a positive correlation  between  high 
tax ratios  and policies that are beneficial  but difficult  to measure,  such as the protection 
of private  property. 
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to classify a country's trade  policy, in which a country  is classified as 
open if it does not have nontariff  barriers  covering 40 percent  or more 
of trade, average tariffs of 40 percent or more, a high black market 
exchange premium, a socialist economy, or a state monopoly on ex- 
ports. These conditions identify as open eighty-nine  countries, includ- 
ing twenty-three  OECD countries  and the "Gang of Four" east Asian 
nations. I calculate that the correlation  of the openness variable with 
the extent of government  is very high: 0.43 for government  expendi- 
tures and 0.54 for government  revenues. 
Thus some kinds of nonbudgetary  government  involvement in the 
economy, such as measures  leading  away  from  openness, are  negatively 
correlated  with budgetary  involvement-high-tax,  high-spending  coun- 
tries are less likely to tamper  with the economy in these other ways. 
This suggests that if openness is really the sine qua non of prosperity, 
then any analysis of the impact of government  tax and spending  must 
also allow openness as an explanatory  variable, and vice versa.4' But 
the story is more complicated because the degree of openness of an 
economy is likely to affect the extent of government  involvement by 
increasing  both the perceived benefits and the costs of government. 
Openness can increase the benefits of government  intervention  if it 
increases  the instability and vulnerability  of national  economies. Gun- 
ner Myrdal argues that "all states have felt themselves compelled to 
undertake  new, radical  intervention"  in response to more chaotic eco- 
nomic relations following openness. Lindbeck  maintains  that govern- 
ments can dampen  the effects of the open economy by increasing  the 
scope of the public economy. He argues  that  overt social insurance  and 
tax systems represent  built-in stabilizers  that smooth  out the peaks and 
valleys of business cycles and  maintain  full employment,  in spite of the 
uncertainties  of demand  inherent  in an open economy. David Cameron 
finds that openness, measured as the percent of GDP comprised by 
exports  and imports  of goods and services in 1960, was the best single 
predictor  of the growth of public revenues relative to output for the 
period 1960-70  for eighteen OECD nations; the simple correlation 
between the two variables  was 0.78.42 
41.  In a Barro-style  growth rate regression with government  consumption  net of 
education  and defense as the government  variable, Sachs and Warner  find that the 
openness  dummy  is positive and significant.  (Sachs and Warner,  1995.) 
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More  recently, economists  have considered  the extent  to which  open- 
ness limits the size of  the public sector by increasing the costs of 
government.  Put simply, openness increases  the elasticity of taxed ac- 
tivities and, therefore, the magnitude of the distortion caused by a 
suboptimal  tax system. To the extent that openness affects the costs 
and benefits of budgetary  government  policy, it will be a determinant 
of G. The details  of the endogenous  determination  of G and  trade  policy 
thus  become critical for assessing what structural  parameters  an empir- 
ical relationship  reveals.43 
One source of the cost of government  involvement is the disincen- 
tives that arise from raising taxes. However, the link between revenue 
collected and the aggregate  disincentive is far from direct. In the sim- 
plest model, the marginal  income tax rate  measures  the increase  in tax 
liability that accompanies earning an additional  dollar of income. At 
any given level of income, this calculation is often relatively straight- 
forward, although care must be taken in determining  the extent of 
income that is legally untaxable, such as fringe benefits. The average 
marginal  tax rate is equal to the average  tax rate in a linear  tax system 
with no intercept, but is higher than the average  the more progressive 
is the tax system. Thus, at a minimum,  the average  tax ratio should  be 
supplemented  with a measure  of progressivity.44 
Moreover, a calculation  of the true  marginal  fiscal disincentive  must 
consider  both taxes paid to the government  and  transfers  received from 
the government. To the extent that the transfers  are means-tested, so 
that their value declines with income, there is an implicit additional 
positive marginal tax rate. In the United States the fact that many 
means-tested  transfer  programs  are targeted  at low-income households 
43.  Christopher  Sims suggests that a social insurance  system might be a political 
condition  for opening an economy, given the vulnerability  to external  shocks that may 
accompany  openness. This implies that openness, itself, is endogenous  and a function 
of at least some components  of G. 
44.  Here it is important  to distinguish  two arguments.  The first is that any given 
level of G may be associated with different  degrees of distortion  due, for example, to 
more or less progressivity and therefore, higher mean marginal  tax rates; this is a 
measurement  problem.  The second is that any given observed  level of G may be asso- 
ciated with various degrees of distortion  because of the different  technologies used to 
raise taxes. Consistent  with the latter  is Easterly's  point in his comment  on this paper, 
that in many developing countries  with pervasive informal  sectors, achieving a given 
tax ratio  requires  much  higher  statutory  rates  on the taxable  sector  than  would  be required 
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implies  that  the highest marginal  tax rates  apply  to those with the lowest 
incomes, not the highest incomes. 
By contrast, when the benefits of government  programs  are contin- 
gent on some level of labor force participation,  either directly or via 
taxes paid, the effective marginal  tax rate  is lowered. Here  the example 
of Sweden is instructive. As Richard  Freeman  notes, the high implicit 
tax rates in the Swedish social welfare system are, to some degree, 
offset because eligibility for most benefits requires  some labor  partici- 
pation, and in other  cases benefits  are an intrinsic  part  of the job.45  For 
example, generous  child care subsidies are tied to previous  labor  force 
participation.  Because these work-related  benefits are conditional on 
holding a job with some moderate  level of hours specified, rather  than 
being proportional  to hours, the disincentive  effects on participation  are 
substantially  muted, although  the system generates  a strong incentive 
to participate  at the minimal level of hours needed to qualify for the 
social welfare benefits. 
Anthony  Atkinson  also argues  for the importance  of the "fine struc- 
ture" of welfare programs  in determining  the disincentive effects of 
social insurance  programs.46  To illustrate  this, he develops a model of 
unemployment  insurance  in which the disincentive effect of the insur- 
ance benefit is less serious because it is tied to the recipient's previous 
employment  record. Note also that in the social security  systems of the 
United States and many other countries expected benefits are tied to 
designated payroll taxes, albeit in a complicated, nonlinear  fashion. 
Martin  Feldstein and Andrew  Samwick  calculate  that although  the sta- 
tutory  marginal  tax on employees was 11.2 percent  in 1990, the actual 
effective marginal  tax rate ranged  from that figure to as low as -  6.0 
percent, depending  on marital  status, age, and discount  rate.47 
One further  complication is that a calculation  of the effective mar- 
ginal tax rate on labor supply must consider the pattern  of commodity 
and excise taxes together with the complementarity  or substitutability 
of leisure with other taxed goods. A uniform  consumption  tax adds to 
the wedge between leisure and other goods and therefore, in order  to 
45.  See Freeman  (1995). 
46.  See Atkinson  (1995). 
47.  Feldstein  and  Samwick  (1992). Note also that  in particular  stylized  models, local 
property  taxes are equivalent  to payments  for local public services and are not distor- 
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obtain the effective marginal  tax rate, it should be added to explicit 
labor  income taxes, with an appropriate  adjustment  for the differing  tax 
base.48  With nonuniform  commodity taxes, the marginal  effective tax 
on labor  must  be calculated  by weighting  each commodity  tax by a term 
related  to its cross-substitution  elasticity with leisure. Taxes on com- 
plements  to leisure  receive a negative  weight, while taxes on substitutes 
to leisure receive a positive weight. For example, the exceptionally 
high Swedish excise taxes on alcoholic beverages (92 percent of the 
retail price of spirits for home consumption)  reduce  the effective mar- 
ginal tax rate on labor supply because they penalize an activity that is 
almost certainly a complement  to leisure.49  As an extreme  example, if 
there is a fixed relationship  at the margin  between leisure and beer at 
the rate of one bottle per hour, then a tax of $2 per bottle is enough to 
offset half the disincentive effect of a 40 percent wage tax rate for a 
worker  making $10 per hour. 
Sweden is not alone in having both high taxes and high excise taxes 
on alcoholic beverages. Kenneth  Messere reports  the fraction  of retail 
price taxes comprised  by home consumption  of beer, spirits, wine, and 
cigarettes  in the OECD countries.50  I calculate a strong  positive corre- 
lation between each of these four values and the overall ratio of tax 
revenue  to GDP (0.28, 0.73, 0.45, and  0.58, respectively), with all but 
the value for beer  being significantly  different  from  zero at the 5 percent 
level. It is not that high-tax countries tax everything a lot, including 
alcohol and  cigarettes;  these excise tax rates  are in addition  to any taxes 
on labor income and imply differences in the relative prices of these 
commodities compared  to all others.5'  Clearly, many aspects of a tax 
system determine  the effective marginal  tax rates generating  disincen- 
tive effects. The discussion above is evidence that these features  may 
mitigate, rather  than exacerbate, the cross-country  differences in ag- 
gregate  disincentive effects suggested by aggregate  tax ratios. 
Most academic  treatments  of the social cost of taxation  have focused 
48.  That  is, a consumption  tax rate  of T assessed  on the net-of-tax  price  is equivalent 
to a labor  income tax of 1/(1 +  T). 
49.  See Messere (1993, p. 423) for the excise tax. 
50.  Messere  (1993). 
51.  The theory  of optimal  commodity  taxation  suggests that these goods should be 
taxed  higher  than  others  because  demand  for them  is relatively  inelastic.  However,  there 
is no presumption  that it is optimal  to single out them  out for extra  taxation  to a greater 
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on the excess burden  created when taxpayers  respond  to taxes by ad- 
justing their consumption basket away from taxed goods to untaxed 
goods, such as leisure. In fact this excess burden  is only one of several, 
conceptually  distinct, sources of cost associated with distinct dimen- 
sions of behavioral  response, and  also with the administrative  and  com- 
pliance costs of collecting taxes. 
Recognizing  the variety  of behavioral  responses  changes  the concep- 
tual link between marginal  tax rates, preferences, and the cost of tax- 
ation. In order to make this proposition  concrete, consider that there 
are only two kinds of behavioral  response to higher taxes-reducing 
labor  supply and increasing  avoidance  expenditures.  "Avoidance" in- 
cludes a whole host of activities that legally reduce tax liability, such 
as hiring a tax professional, buying tax software, and reorganizing  a 
business  into a tax-preferred  form. How much  expenditure  on avoidance 
is optimal for any given tax rate does not depend directly on prefer- 
ences, but on aspects of the tax system that, as a group, may be termed 
the "avoidance technology." 
At first glance, adding another kind of behavioral response only 
serves to increase the cost of levying a given amount  of tax revenue. 
The total cost of taxation now includes both the excess burden  that 
arises from the distortion  of the consumption  basket, including  excess 
consumption  of leisure, and also taxpayer  expenditures  on avoidance. 
But as I have discussed elsewhere, the effective marginal  tax rate on 
labor  supply depends  in subtle ways on the avoidance  technology.52  If, 
for example, increased  true  income  from  labor  facilitates  (that  is, lowers 
the marginal  cost of) tax avoidance, then  the effective marginal  tax rate 
on labor is lower than the statutory  marginal  tax rate. Such an effect 
could arise if the Internal  Revenue Service (IRS) used an audit  rule for 
charitable  contributions  that was based on the ratio of charitable  con- 
tributions  to income. 
The avoidance technology could change the margin  for the real be- 
havioral  response  in an  even more  direct  way. Consider  the hypothetical 
situation  where, for a fixed fee, an individual  could pay tax on a des- 
ignated  portion  of income at a uniform  tax rate  that  was lower than  the 
highest rate under  the ordinary  tax system. This situation  is illustrated 
in figure 19. The regular  tax schedule is given by ODACE  but, for a 
52.  See Slemrod  (1994). 410  Brookings  Papers on Economic  Activity, 2:1995 







0  D  G  H 
Taxable  income 
Source: Author's model as described in text. 
fee equal to AB, taxable income greater  than G could be made subject 
to the marginal  tax rate indicated  by the slope of BCF.  In this example 
the effective tax schedule becomes ODACF,  so that the marginal  tax 
rate  is actually  lower for incomes above  H than  it is for incomes  between 
G and  H. Lower  marginal  tax rates  for the highest  percentile  of incomes 
are a feature of  optimal income tax structures  in simple analytical 
models but are rarely observed in statutory  tax structures.53  Neverthe- 
less, during  the long period when the corporate  tax rate was far below 
the highest personal  rate in the United States, the option to incorporate 
a business firm and retain earnings was a way to put a cap on the 
effective tax rate, for a fee. In addition  the zero, or low, rate  on capital 
gains effectively allows individuals  who convert ordinary  income into 
53.  For such a model, see Slemrod  and others  (1994). Joel Slemrod  411 
capital  gains to face a lower marginal  tax rate  than  a superficial  look at 
the tax schedules might suggest. 
It is likely that these aspects of the tax code are present in many 
countries not by coincidence but rather, because they act as safety 
valves that ensure that the most productive  members  of society are not 
discouraged  from participating  in economic activity. For the same rea- 
son, certain forms of tax avoidance are tolerated. Undoubtedly  the 
extent to which these safety valves are used varies across countries; 
however, by their nature it is difficult to quantitatively  assess their 
presence because they often depend on the technical aspects of a tax 
code and also on the degree of enforcement  of some aspects  of the law. 
These examples of tax avoidance have two things in common. In 
both cases the marginal  tax rate on income is lower than the statutes 
indicate, either because of the subsidy implicit in the facilitation of 
avoidance  or because of a particular  feature  of the tax law. Yet in both 
cases the traditional  excess burden  understates  the total cost of collect- 
ing taxes because this measure does not include the resource cost of 
avoiding taxes, which may be related  to qualifying  for the low-tax-rate 
regime. 
This latter point is relevant to the topic at hand because, although 
excess burden  due to tax distortions  is a subtle  cost for national  income 
accounts  to capture, the other types of cost, for the most part, are not 
even meant to be captured.  The time spent by taxpayers, themselves, 
on tax matters  is unlikely to substitute  for market  work and so will not 
reduce  national  income. The gainful employment  of accountants,  law- 
yers, other tax professionals,  and IRS employees  counts in GNP, 
whether they are providing truly productive services or not. These 
resource  costs of taxation  other  than  excess burden  are far from trivial. 
My own research  suggests that the resource  costs of the U.S.  income 
tax system are about 10 cents for every dollar collected, or about 
1 percent  of GNP."4 
Economic models of the response  to taxation,  almost  without  excep- 
tion, focus on the behavior  of atomistic  agents-individuals  and firms. 
In practice, nongovernmental  institutions and associations may also 
adjust  to the changed incentives of a high-tax-rate  regime. Note, for 
54.  For  additional  information  on the resource  costs of taxation,  see Blumenthal  and 
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example, that  many  nongovernmental  organizations  that  provide  goods 
and  services charge  income-tested  or wealth-tested  prices. Examples  in 
the United States include some university-affiliated  child care provid- 
ers, the American  Economic Association, and certain religious orga- 
nizations. One of the largest  such privately  imposed  taxes in the United 
States relates to education. Means-based  financial  aid is pervasive for 
private and public college education, and for precollege private edu- 
cation. Feldstein reports  that need-based  college scholarship  rules can 
impose an additional  marginal  tax rate of between 22 and 47 percent 
on parents' incremental  labor earnings  during  the years of a student's 
matriculation.5  In comparing  the U.S. tax system with that  of a country 
where higher education  receives public financing  by means of a grad- 
uated income tax system, it would be possible to be misled into over- 
stating  the relative disincentive effects of the latter  system. 
Other  nongovernmental  institutions  may adjust  to a high-tax  regime, 
offsetting  the disincentives  otherwise  created.  Charles  Clotfelter  reports 
that, among  the only four OECD  countries  with sufficient  data, there  is 
a negative association between the degree of redistribution  of a coun- 
try's tax and transfer  system and the size of the nonprofit  sector.56  One 
explanation  for this correlation  is what he calls a "compensation  prin- 
ciple," by which the nonprofit  sector adjusts  to the peculiarities  of the 
other  sectors of the population. Here again a comparison  of the United 
States  and  Sweden is instructive.  In Sweden  the state  church  is financed 
by income tax levies at rates set by church  municipalities  and  collected 
by the central  government;  no such system exists in the United States. 
In light of the fact that many Americans  consider a tithe to be a moral 
responsibility, a simple comparison  of government  marginal  tax rates 
that includes the Swedish church  levies will overstate  the relative dis- 
incentives present in Sweden.s7 
The family is another  example of an institution  or association  whose 
implicit incentive structure  is likely to be endogenous  to the activities 
of government. Consider the following observation  on the extended 
family structure  that is prevalent  in preindustrial,  low-tax societies: 
[The extended  family] provides shelter  and food for all of its members, 
55.  Feldstein  (1995). 
56.  See Clotfelter  (1995). 
57.  Whether  a voluntary  contribution  to a religious  organization  acts as a disincen- 
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regardless  of their individual  contributions,  so that the indigent  and the 
indolent  alike are cared  for in a sort of "social security" system. Work- 
ing members  are expected to pool their  earnings  for the benefit  of every- 
one in the extended  family; individual  saving is discouraged....  Thus, 
the  joint or extended  family tends  to dilute individual  incentives  to work, 
save, and invest.58 
As has been often remarked, many of the programs of the welfare state 
have replaced family  arrangements with similar goals.  It is also argu- 
able that the explicit  tax rates of the welfare state have, to some degree, 
replaced the implicit tax rates and disincentives  of the extended family 
in countries without social  welfare  systems. 
Collective  bargaining institutions offer one more intriguing example 
of the adaptation of institutions to government activity.  The collective 
setting of  a wage-employment  bargain is more valuable  in a high-tax 
society  where taxpayers,  left to their atomistic decisions,  might choose 
to work at an intensity  far below  the undistorted level.  Thus for any 
given cost of more corporatist collective  bargaining regimes,  the gains 
are greater in a high-tax country, and it is therefore reasonable to expect 
that more corporatist regimes  emerge in high-tax countries. 
A  related  argument  is  offered  by  Lawrence  Summers,  Jonathan 
Gruber, and Rodrigo Vergara.59 They explain differences  in tax levels 
and tax structures among OECD countries  by referring to differences 
in the extent  to which  labor market institutions  are '"corporatist,  "  or 
centralized.  They argue that in economies  with centralized labor mar- 
kets,  taxes  on labor supply will  be less  distortionary than when labor 
supply is determined individually,  because the central decisionmakers 
will  recognize  the linkage between  the taxes that workers pay and the 
benefits that they receive.  Using  an index of corporatism developed  by 
Lars Calmfors and John Driffill,  they find a strong positive relationship 
betweenr corporatism and the ratio of total revenues  to GNP.60 More- 
over,  this  result  applies  only  to  taxes  on  labor  income,  and not  to 
nonlabor income taxes, corporate taxes, property taxes, or wealth taxes. 
They also  provide  cross-country  empirical  support for a direct impli- 
cation of their model; that for a given  level of taxes,  a tax increase will 
reduce labor supply by less  in a more corporatist economy. 
58.  Kerr  and others (1960, p. 79). 
59.  See Summers,  Gruber,  and Vergara  (1993). 
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Summers, Gruber, and Vegara go to some effort to investigate 
whether  the tax structure  (or labor supply) is only correlated  with the 
degree of corporatism  by coincidence, because both are related  to an- 
other country characteristic,  such as the political ideology. They do 
not, however, entertain  the possibility of reverse causation-that  cor- 
poratist  labor  market  institutions  are  more likely to evolve in a country 
where  there is a large government  sector and, therefore,  a high level of 
taxes. Instead  they use Sweden and  Austria  as case studies  to investigate 
the causal  connection  between labor  market  centralization  and  levels of 
taxation. Citing T. L. Johnston, they argue that Sweden's corporatist 
labor market  institutions  developed in the 1950s and centralized  wage 
negotiations  not until 1956; the huge increase  in Swedish tax revenues 
began soon after 1960.61 The story is not so simple. Swedish corpora- 
tism can be dated  back  to the Saltsjobaden  agreements  of 1938, in which 
the Swedish Employers'  Federation  and  the major  trade  union  congress 
negotiated a set of arrangements  that facilitated cooperation  between 
labor markets  and the state and "accepted responsibility  to act in the 
broader  public interest."62  Furthermore,  in 1941 the labor union con- 
gress enacted a legislative change that radically  restricted  the indepen- 
dence of its member  unions. Thus the causal link between corporatism 
and the expanded  state is not as immediate  as Summers, Gruber,  and 
Vegara  suggest because the labor  unions accepted  the responsibility  to 
act in the public interest at least two decades before the takeoff in 
Swedish government  spending and taxation. 
Because corporatism  mitigates  the labor  supply  disincentive  costs of 
high taxes,  it is  more likely to evolve  in a society that has, or is 
contemplating  having, an active government. In the presence of cor- 
poratism,  though, the total social cost of taxation  must  include  not only 
the excess burden  of suboptimal  labor supply, but also whatever  costs 
accompany  corporatist  labor market  institutions, such as limited flexi- 
bility in accommodating  intersectoral  or intrasectoral  changes in pro- 
ductivity.  These additional  costs, to some extent, offset the lower-than- 
otherwise disincentive costs. 
The chicken-and-egg question of whether exogenous institutional 
change facilitated a large government  in Sweden, or whether  a larger 
61.  Johnston  (1962). 
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government made certain institutions more beneficial and therefore 
more likely, is not readily settled. Nevertheless, the latter  mechanism 
is important  and merits more consideration  by students of public fi- 
nance. Freeman  makes a related observation  in reference to Sweden: 
"Economic agents, modes of behavior, and institutional  rules in one 
part  of a tightly linked economy adapt  to the operation  of all other  parts 
and thus will suffer a loss in efficiency when one of those other com- 
ponents  changes. For  example, a wage-setting  system  that  is well suited 
for a regime of high income taxes .  .  . may be poorly suited to a regime 
of low income taxes."63 
In conclusion, four factors complicate the link between the real be- 
havioral elasticities with respect to relative prices and the economic 
cost of a high-tax regime: 
-The  availability of nontax, nonbudgetary  instruments  to achieve 
policy goals. 
-The  availability of safety valves within tax and transfer  systems 
that mitigate the disincentive costs generated. 
-The  availability  of individual  behavioral  responses  other  than  the 
standard  real responses, such as tax avoidance  and evasion. 
-The  possibility of institutional  response to increased  taxation. 
Incorporating  these factors into the study of the cost of government 
suggests a large and intellectually challenging research agenda that 
would refine understanding  of the link between government  involve- 
ment, prosperity,  and growth. 
63.  Freeman  (1995, p. 17). Comments 
and Discussion 
William G. Gale: How government  policies affect economic welfare 
is one of the oldest, most studied, and most controversial  topics in 
economics. Joel Slemrod  has written  a comprehensive  and compelling 
paper  on why it is difficult to obtain meaningful  information  on these 
issues from studies that use aggregate  cross-country  data. Because his 
critique is fundamental  and, I believe, correct, it is worth reviewing 
some of the main elements before considering  how to proceed in the 
aftermath.  The problems  fall into at least three categories. 
First, there  are  actually  two theoretical  and  econometric  relationships 
that need to be disentangled. One relation  derives the optimal  level of 
government  as a function of the marginal  benefits and marginal  costs 
of government  programs. Under plausible assumptions, this relation 
implies that the optimal level of government  spending  is an increasing 
function  of the level of income, as shown in equation  4. 
The other relation links the total net costs of government  programs 
to the level or growth of  income, as expressed in equation 9.  This 
relation  is the equation  of interest  in determining  the effects of govern- 
ment on prosperity. Figure 14 portrays  the equation as implying that 
more government reduces economic activity, but more government 
could, in fact, raise or reduce economic activity, especially over se- 
lected ranges or types of government  spending. 
Estimating  the latter relation is difficult, though, because the gov- 
ernment  measures are endogenous. Along these lines, figures 11-13 
and  the surrounding  discussion provide  an exceptionally  clear  and  com- 
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pelling example of the dangers  of interpreting  a reduced-form  equation 
as a structural  equation. 
As noted in the paper, one way to resolve the problem is to find 
explanatory  variables in the equation  determining  the optimal  level of 
government  spending  that  do not have any influence  on the overall  level 
or growth  rate of income. It is not clear that any very good candidates 
exist. An alternative  approach  is to use data  from some policy event or 
natural  experiment,  but again, it is not clear  that  any good opportunities 
exist. 
Second, it is very difficult to obtain a meaningful  measure  of "gov- 
ernment"  or "taxes" from aggregate  studies. For  example, a meaning- 
ful measure  of taxes would capture  the impact  of taxation  on the budget 
constraints of  households and firms. These impacts, of course, are 
difficult to capture  succinctly for any single tax system, and the prob- 
lems become immense when examining differences across systems. 
Here are some of the problems: tax revenues provide a measure of 
average  tax rates, but a measure  of the marginal  tax rate  would be more 
closely related to the incentives created;  marginal  tax rates typically 
vary widely across the income spectrum  and hence are difficult  to cap- 
ture  in any aggregate;  many attempts  to measure  marginal  tax rates  fail 
to include  the effects of phase-outs  from  spending  programs  that  reduce 
benefits as recipients' incomes rise, or the effects of what Slemrod 
refers to as safety valves in the tax system that reduce the effective 
marginal  rate on some very productive  households;  the effects of tax 
avoidance and evasion activities are difficult to measure;  and the full 
marginal  tax rate due to the interaction  of, for example, an income tax 
with consumption  taxes is difficult to capture. 
More generally, the difficulties in accounting  for government  have 
received a tremendous  amount of attention in recent years, with the 
clear implication  that  figures  for aggregate  government  spending  or tax 
revenue  obscure  many dimensions  of policy. Policies can often be var- 
iously enacted in ways that create equivalent, or nearly equivalent, 
economic incentives but  have vastly different  implications  for spending 
and  revenue  aggregates. Programs  like mandates,  credit  programs,  and 
trade policies can all substitute for traditional  spending and revenue 
options. Further,  it is not clear whether  some programs  are appropri- 
ately classified as spending  or tax programs-for  example, the earned 418  Brookings  Papers on Economic  Activity, 2:1995 
income tax credit-or  whether  such a distinction  even makes sense in 
some cases. 
Third, "prosperity"  can be measured  along several  dimensions.  Us- 
ing the most common measure of prosperity-measures  of national 
income or output-omits  many of the channels  through  which govern- 
ment programs  are intended  to operate. It is well known that national 
income  accounts  do not measure  social welfare  or well-being. Estimates 
of GDP do not place a value on life style or environmental  considera- 
tions, broadly defined; they omit the value of  leisure, they do not 
consider the distribution  of resources, and so forth. Yet since many 
government  programs  are intended to address precisely these issues, 
estimates of the effects of government  on measures  of GDP or related 
concepts will systematically understate  the value of government  pro- 
grams. In short, showing that government  programs  do not raise mea- 
sured  output  does not imply that  these programs  have no, or even little, 
economic value. 
The paper  describes  additional  considerations,  but the bottom  line is 
clear: top-down studies of the effects of government  on the economy 
appear  to face a difficult, and  perhaps  insurmountable,  task. A corollary 
point is that focusing on the effects of government  on income growth, 
rather  than income levels,  does not resolve any of the conceptual or 
identification  problems  raised in the paper. 
In light of the issues raised here, resesarch might proceed along 
various paths. One option is to improve the cross-country  estimates. 
This would involve determining  appropriate  measures  of government 
and  prosperity,  and finding  appropriate  explanatory  variables  or policy 
events to provide clean estimates of the effects of government  on the 
economy that are not contaminated  by the feedback effect of how the 
level of income affects the level of government.  This would appear  to 
be a difficult task. 
A second approach  is to continue  focusing on the bottom-up  studies 
of conventional  topics, such as the impact of taxes and spending  pro- 
grams  on labor supply, saving, and investment. The aggregate  impact 
of government  activities would then have to be inferred  from  the micro- 
economic studies, rather  than  being estimated  directly. But studies  that 
can accurately capture one of the many effects of public policy are 
likely to be of more use to policymakers  and researchers  than studies 
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Third,  the paper  advocates  a broad  focus on the  effects of government 
policies, including their impact on the structure  of families, the non- 
profit sector, collective bargaining structures, and other institutions 
within the economy. This raises a variety of new research  questions 
that will undoubtedly  shed light in the future  on additional  aspects of 
the impact of government  on economic activity. But it also serves to 
emphasize  that progress  in research  is hard  won. Studies that claim to 
address  the overall impact  of something  as complex as government  on 
something  as complex as economic prosperity  face difficult  challenges. 
William Easterly: This paper  ambles thoughtfully  down the long and 
winding  road  from taxes to economic growth. Joel Slemrod  is the ideal 
travel companion. He provides many subtle insights based on his long 
experience of thinking about these issues, drawing  from a rich assort- 
ment of disaggregate  and aggregate  studies of tax effects. 
My comments  address  the question  in the title:  What  do cross-country 
studies teach about government  involvement, prosperity,  and growth? 
Slemrod's  answer  at the end of the  journey  is, "not much.  " Ultimately, 
I agree with this nihilistic conclusion, but I prefer the more positive 
way in which he puts the question  elsewhere in the paper:  If the cost of 
government  is so large, why is this cost so difficult to discern  in time- 
series or cross-country  studies?  The paper  provides  some good answers 
to this question. I will take a different approach  that in a few cases 
changes, and in other cases reinforces, the story that Slemrod  tells. 
There are three elements to this approach.  First, I compare  the tax 
variable  to other policy variables that do work in growth regressions 
and ask why-if  there is some relation between taxes and growth-it 
is harder  to make the tax variable work. The answer is the lack of 
extreme experiments with taxes, such as exist with other variables. 
There  are, for example, extreme  high-inflation  experiments  that  do help 
to detect a relationship  between inflation  and growth. 
Second, I believe that the reason why analysts do not observe ex- 
treme  tax experiments  has to do with the difference  between  tax revenue 
and tax rates. Most empirical work, including this paper, uses the 
former;  it is the latter  that  the models are about. There  may be extreme 
experiments  with tax rates, but it is difficult to detect them when ob- 
serving tax revenue. 
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ticularly  misleading as a proxy for tax rates. This factor  is very impor- 
tant for developing countries, which make up most of the sample. 
In regard  to the first  point, figure 11 shows that quite high tax rates 
are needed to detect any growth  effect. This is partly  because the rela- 
tionship  between taxes and growth  is nonmonotonic,  as Barro  and oth- 
ers point out. And it is partly because of the curvature  of the line, as 
Barro  also points out.  ' Close to the optimum,  the derivative  of growth 
with respect  to taxes is close to zero. There  must  be some countries  far 
away from the optimum  of growth  with respect to tax rates in order  to 
be able to detect a relationship  between tax rates and growth. 
Imagine  an analogous  graph  of the relationship  between growth  and 
the inflation rate. Inflation may act as a tax on the cash-in-advance 
requirements  of capital investment.  The seigniorage  revenues  could be 
used for productive  purposes,  as are  conventional  tax revenues.  Around 
the optimal inflation rate, it would be hard to detect any effect of 
inflation  on growth.  In practice,  analysts  observe  extreme  inflation  rates 
that are likely very far from the optimum. These extreme inflation 
observations  help to establish some empirical  relationship  between in- 
flation  and growth. Michael Bruno  and  I have recently  shown that  there 
is little evidence for any  relationship  between  inflation  and  growth  when 
inflation  is below 40 percent. However, growth  clearly does fall during 
discrete episodes of extreme inflation.2 
Why do the governments  that print money to extremes not also tax 
to extremes?  The answer  cannot  be that  governments  maximize  growth 
with respect to tax rates, since they do not maximize growth with 
respect to anything else.  There are well-known reasons of political 
economy, well-known even to the average voter, why governments 
might wish to optimize pork-barrel  opportunities,  rather  than welfare 
or growth. 
1. For both points, see Barro  (1990). 
2.  See Bruno  and Easterly  (1995). Other  empirical  studies, such as Fischer  (1993), 
De Gregorio  (1993), and Barro  (1995), have also found strong effects of inflation  on 
growth  in pooled time-series, cross-country  data  sets. Bruno  and I find  that  the extreme 
inflation  observations  and  the time dimension  play an important  role in these results;  the 
effects are stronger  the shorter  the time horizon. We also show that growth recovers 
fully (maybe even more than fully) to the precrisis  trend after inflation  is stabilized, 
which could mean either that inflation has level effects on output, or that there is a 
permanent  change for the better  in growth  after  a "beneficial  crisis," as in Drazen  and 
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Table  BI. A Tale of Two  Tax Systems:  Peru and Sweden 
Percent 
Indicator  Peru  Sweden 
Real  per  capita  growth, 1970-90  -  1  .1  1  .8 
Tax ratio  to GDP, average  1970-90  7  47 
VAT rate, 1990-93  18  23 
VAT compliance  ratio, 1990-93  32  95 
Informal  sector  share  in labor  force, 1990-93  56  ... 
Source: Data for per capita growth and tax rates to GDP are from figure 7; for the VAT rate and compliance ratio, from 
Silvani and Brondolo (1993); and for the informal sector, from Loayza (1995). 
The answer may, instead, be that it is hard  to tell whether  govern- 
ments are setting high tax rates  or not. The problem  is that  analysts  use 
tax revenue, not tax rates. Inflation  is analogous  in this metaphor  to the 
tax rate, not to the tax revenue. When households try to evade the 
inflation  tax, they drive up the inflation  rate, and so the experiment  is 
more noticeable in the data. Whereas when households evade a high 
tax, they drive down tax revenue, and so the high-tax experiment  is 
less noticeable  in the data. If there  are large variations  across  countries 
in the degree to which households can evade taxes, these could easily 
swamp the differences in tax rates. Then the extreme  high-tax experi- 
ments required  to clearly detect a relationship  between growth  and tax 
are  not visible in the data. Economists  use tax revenue  precisely  because 
they have trouble measuring  tax rates; I discuss the issue of trying to 
measure  tax rates directly, below. 
As to the second point, that  tax revenue  is not an effective proxy for 
tax rates, consider  figure  7, a scatter  diagram  of tax  revenue  and  growth. 
There is little association between the two, which is the striking  non- 
result  that  Slemrod  makes  much  of in this paper.  Take  a pair  of countries 
from the extreme points of the tax distribution.  Peru has negative per 
capita growth and has the lowest ratio of tax revenue to GDP in the 
entire sample. At the other extreme is Sweden, with the highest tax 
revenue in the sample, at least, the highest for any country that has 
never had a statue of Lenin in the main square. 
Table B  1 shows that Sweden has a ratio of taxes to GDP that is 
almost seven times higher than that of Peru, yet Sweden's per capita 
growth rate is about 2.5  percentage points higher than that of Peru. 
This uncooperative  pair is a good example of how the data mock at- 
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The next step is to go behind  tax revenue  and look at tax rates  in this 
pair  of countries. One tax rate  for which there  are data  across  countries 
is the value added  tax (VAT) rate. It is also possible to obtain data  on 
VAT revenue  across countries. Carlos  Silvani and  John  Brondolo  com- 
pute the ratio of actual VAT payments to legally required  VAT pay- 
ments-the  tax compliance ratio-from  data on statutory  VAT tax 
rates, VAT revenue, and the legal tax base.3  They find large variations 
in compliance  ratios across countries, which can be seen from  table B 1 
in the drastically  lower compliance ratio in Peru  than in Sweden. 
It is really this difference in tax compliance  that  explains the differ- 
ence between the ratio of tax revenue to GDP in Peru and in Sweden. 
The statutory  VAT tax rate  is less than  one-third  higher  in Sweden  than 
in Peru. This is not the dramatic experiment that might have been 
expected from the fact that Sweden has seven times the tax revenue  of 
Peru. Other  growth  determinants  in the two countries  swamp  any mod- 
est effects of the difference in tax rates. 
In regard  to the third  point, the crucial  reason  why Peru's  compliance 
is so different  from Sweden's is that Peru has a large informal  sector, 
as table B1 shows. There is no direct estimate of Sweden's informal 
sector, but it seems obvious that it is smaller than that of Peru at 56 
percent  of GDP. In Peru a firm  has the opportunity  to escape taxation 
by shifting production  into the informal  sector; in Sweden this oppor- 
tunity  is much less widely available. The tax rate  influences  the size of 
the informal  sector, but its size also varies for other reasons, external 
to the analysis. 
The existence of this exit opportunity  has implications  like those of 
the evasion technologies that Slemrod  discusses for the U.S. tax code. 
The results could be similarly subtle. Suppose that there is no big loss 
of efficiency associated  with shifting into the informal  sector. Suppose, 
also, that there is not really any need for the tax revenue because the 
government  is not going to put it to productive  use anyway. In this 
case,  the informal sector just allows citizens to protect themselves 
against  the tax policies of the government.  So there is not likely to be 
much tax effect at all, if there is an easily available  informal  sector. 
On the other hand, it could be costly to substitute  informal sector 
production  for formal sector production.  There could be a large effi- 
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ciency loss from shifting production  out of modern  factories  into back- 
yard workshops  in order to hide from the tax authorities.  If there are 
such losses, then  there  will be large  tax effects on growth.  These growth 
losses happen  even though  there is very little tax revenue  at the end of 
the day. 
The informal sector could provide a simple explanation  for the in- 
verse relationship  that Slemrod  notes between measures  of distortions 
(for example, financial  repression)  and tax revenue. If the government 
has distortionary  policies,  it drives even more production  out of the 
formal  sector. The government  cannot  raise much  tax revenue  if a large 
proportion  of the production  is hiding in the informal  sector. 
For these and other reasons, tax revenue does not work well as a 
proxy variable for the marginal tax rate. So the immediate solution 
would seem to be to obtain tax rate data. As a soldier in the army of 
researchers  that has tried to storm the stronghold  of international  tax 
data, I cannot be too encouraging. This citadel has, so far, held out 
against the siege. It is very hard  to figure  out from the welter of inter- 
national tax codes exactly what the statutory  tax rate is in a given 
country. Nor it is it trivial to trace how statutory  rates map into the 
effective marginal  tax rate  facing the average  person.  Moreover,  crucial 
variables, such as tax penalties, enforcement, and corruption, are 
mostly unobservable. 
This is not to say that all cross-country  explorations  of aggregate 
fiscal variables  are impossible. Some things are more easily measured 
than others. Many researchers  have detected an association between 
high budget  deficits and low growth. Others  have found a strong  asso- 
ciation between government  investment in infrastructure  and growth, 
even if causality remains unresolved. There is a robust  reduced-form 
relationship  between size of government  and such country  characteris- 
tics as per capita income, population size,  and share of agriculture. 
Further  work on this relationship  could be a useful check on the kinds 
of demand-for-government  models that Slemrod  discusses.4 
However, I believe that most of the information  about government 
intervention  in markets  will not come from aggregate  fiscal variables. 
Instead, it will come from the more indirect  measures  of government 
4.  See Easterly and Rebelo (1993) for references and discussion of some of the 
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intervention  in the economy, such as inflation  rates, price distortions, 
black  market  premiums,  and financial  repression.  The more extreme  of 
these interventions,  at least, are associated  with low economic growth. 
Evidence has so far been insufficient to convict government  on the 
charge of lowering growth through  formal taxation. On other tax-like 
interventions,  government  is likely to be found guilty as charged. 
General Discussion 
Members  of the panel suggested  a variety  of potential  theoretical  and 
empirical  explanations for the weak relationship  in the cross-country 
data between the size of government and growth. Christopher  Sims 
noted that Bagwell and Bernheim's paper on Ricardian  equivalence 
provides one explanation, since government  activities may substitute 
for those that would otherwise be carried  out by private institutions. 
For example, in less developed economies, private activities include 
social insurance, and a variety of village-level organizations  perform 
some of the functions  of a welfare state. Whether  the costs and  benefits 
of such functions are associated with the central government  or the 
private  sector thus depends  on the particular  institutional  arrangements 
that have evolved. 
Benjamin  Friedman  noted the relevance of this argument  to the cur- 
rent political debate. He observed that assistance provided through 
churches, foundation  charities, and family networks  that, according  to 
today's conservatives, is to take the place of many government  activi- 
ties is subject  to the same tension between  equity and  incentives  as that 
created  when government  provides  assistance. Hence he suggested  that 
the two arguments  made  by conservatives,  that  government  welfare  will 
be replaced by private welfare, and that this reduction  in government 
involvement  in social insurance  will enhance  the incentives  for growth, 
are  inconsistent.  According  to Friedman,  it is likely that  incentives  will 
be enhanced  only to the extent that replacement  of government  assis- 
tance is incomplete. James Duesenberry  asserted  that there is no need 
for a new experiment  to determine  whether  private charity would re- 
place government  social programs,  pointing  out that  this country's  ex- 
perience in the nineteenth  century makes it clear that private charity 
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Richard  Cooper argued that looking for evidence of a relationship 
between government size  and growth in cross-country data is mis- 
guided. Even if such a relationship  were to be found, he argued  that it 
would not imply a causal link between government  size and growth, 
and he gave two examples to underline  this point. First, assuming  that 
government expenditures are largely services provided by labor, as 
countries  become wealthy wages rise relative to the prices of goods so 
that the ratio of G to Y rises, even with constant  real expenditures  on 
government  services. As a result, in a cross-country  regression  there 
will be a positive relationship  between growth and the G-to-Y ratio, 
even though  there  is no causal  relation  between  the two. Second, almost 
all communist  countries  grew rapidly  in the 1950s and 1960s and also 
had large governments that were investing large surpluses extracted 
from  the public. But neoclassical growth  theory  teaches  that  economies 
that save a lot and start  with low capital stocks will experience strong 
growth before decreasing returns  eventually reduce the growth incre- 
ment  to zero. The lesson is that  government  size, per se, is not inform- 
ative; analysis needs to focus more precisely on the mechanisms  by 
which government  may affect growth. 
Henry Aaron suggested another pitfall in using size to judge the 
impact  of the public sector on economic growth. Variations  in the size 
of the public sector arise from whether  the government  assumes direct 
or indirect  responsibility  for social programs.  One country  might rely 
on an extensive government social insurance program, and another 
might achieve the same social objective by regulating  private  pension 
plans. Alternative approaches  would lead to large differences in the 
size of the measured  public sector, even though the effects on growth 
would be similar. He asked whether anyone thought  that there was a 
first-order  difference  in the distortion  associated  with financing  a given 
amount  of health care through  payroll taxes, rather  than through  the 
private  sector in a substantially  involuntary  way. According  to Aaron, 
if the United States had the financing structure  of Britain, France, or 
Germany  it would have a public sector larger by 5 or 6 percentage 
points of GDP without significantly  changing the government's  direct 
or indirect  effect on the economy. 
James  Poterba  cautioned  that  the weak relationship  between  govern- 
ment size and growth in the data should not be taken as evidence that 
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relationship  should not be seen as evidence for disregarding  distortive 
effects of high marginal tax rates or inefficient public expenditures. 
Poterba  was, nonetheless, puzzled by the weak results, since he had 
expected that the correlation  between distortionary  marginal  tax rates 
and  measures  of the size of government  would be quite  strong However 
Cooper noted that, from his knowledge of  individual countries, he 
would not expect a high correlation  across countries of marginal  tax 
rates with the ratio of tax revenue to GNP. 
Panel members  also suggested alternatives  to the cross-country  ap- 
proach  followed in this paper. Sims noted that several  recent  real busi- 
ness cycle models include an explicit government  sector. These models 
treat taxes and government spending separately, and so are able to 
address  the central  question  of what  happens  to growth  when the effects 
of distortionary  taxation and productive spending are considered si- 
multaneously. Although the calibration  of such models does not lead 
to precise answers, the framework  allows exploration  of this combined 
effect under  a variety  of assumptions  about  how taxes and  expenditures 
each affect the production  process. Sims also pointed out that cross- 
section studies of U.S.  states appear  to find potentially  positive effects 
of government  spending  on growth. Although  these studies suffer from 
some of the same identification  problems  that  beset cross-country  stud- 
ies, they are less vulnerable  to the charge that substantial  cultural  and 
institutional  differences across countries  contaminate  the results. 
John Shoven commented on the treatment  of government  in com- 
putational  general  equilibrium  (CGE)  models. CGE  analysis  is predom- 
inantly used for differential  tax analysis, looking at how different  tax 
regimes can finance the same total revenue and the same government 
expenditure  package.  While these studies  provide  information  about  the 
marginal  excess burden  of various  taxes, they are necessarily  silent on 
the issue of small versus large government. Shoven noted that better 
understanding  of the way government  expenditures  directly affect pri- 
vate productivity  is a prerequisite  for using the CGE framework.  Even 
marginal  excess burden  calculations  are  based on tenuous  assumptions; 
such calculations  require  marginal  tax rates, but neither  statutory  rates 
nor information  on tax shares provides a satisfactory  measure  of the 
marginal  rates facing a typical agent. 
Several panel members  commented  on the relevance  of the Swedish 
experience to the debate over small versus large government.  Robert Joel Slemrod  427 
Hall argued  that Sweden's economic success with a large  public sector 
may reflect the fact that the government  has successfully suppressed 
value-destroying  activities, like organized  crime. A large G-to-Y  ratio 
may not have a negative impact on growth because effective govern- 
ment may be highly correlated  with the size of the government  sector. 
In support  of this hypothesis, Hall cited the success of large corpora- 
tions that effectively  function, internally, as command economies, 
much  like the government  sector in Sweden. In part, large  corporations 
are successful because they, too, suppress  value-destroying  activities. 
Gregory  Mankiw thought the large corporation  analogy a useful one, 
since an employee who does not perform  a specific task is fired. This 
is analogous to the Swedish approach  to unemployment,  whereby the 
unemployed are found jobs by the government  and their benefits are 
terminated  if they do not accept these employment  opportunities.  Hall 
added that through most of the postwar period, in both Sweden and 
Israel, work was effectively compulsory. Someone who did not accept 
the counseling of the employment service about what  job to take was 
dropped  from the system and punished severely. In this sense, Hall 
thought  that the Swedish and the Israeli cases resemble the extended 
family. 
John Haltiwanger noted that advocates of small government  cite 
allocative inefficiencies arising from the distortions  created  by the tax 
structure  or regulation.  Seemingly inconsistent  with this view, Sweden 
has among the highest rates of job creation and  job destruction  in the 
OECD. Even with what is regarded  as a nonmarket  and heavy-handed 
approach,  Sweden seems to be reallocating  jobs across  production  sites 
at a rapid  rate. Duesenberry  noted that Sweden has a very active labor 
reallocation  system that has the cooperation  of both workers  and em- 
ployers. The similarity  of Scandinavian  countries  in terms of govern- 
ment size and growth record led Robert  Shiller to raise the possibility 
that cultural differences, rather  than differences in government  size, 
might account  for differences in growth  rates across countries.  He pro- 
posed a spatial autoregressive  model where the growth rate would be 
regressed  on the neighbors' incomes and government  variables  to see 
if government  size still significantly  affected growth. 428  Brookings  Papers on Economic  Activity,  2:1995 
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